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Positive-Sum Global Justice 
Pockets of Prosperity 
Aiden sits on the floor in his private bedroom. He connects one block to 
another. A $90 Lego Minecraft Nether Fortress emerges from the scattered 
pieces. His younger brother, Keaton, pesters him to share the Zombie Pigman 
action figure. Finally, Aiden relents, and Keaton smiles. 
Both children have Band-Aids on their arms. Yesterday, they received flu 
shots. Neither has ever caught the flu, and perhaps neither ever will. 
The next day, their parents cart them off, in leather-lined vehicles, to vi­
olin, piano, and acting practice. They spend the second part of the day playing 
with friends. Each day they eat three full and healthy meals, unless they ruin 
their appetites by sneaking Trader Joe's pumpkin bars from their pantry. 
Several hundred miles away, Miles is playing with his new Thomas the 
Train toy. Losing Thomas is about the worst thing imaginable to him. Earlier 
today, his father took him to the local Museum of Life and Sciences. Miles 
played in the tree houses, saw some farm animals, and took a train ride him­
self. Hundreds of other kids were there also enjoying themselves. Miles is 
barely two years old, but has already received some of the best health care 
available in the world. 
The three boys will get twelve years of high-quality elementary and sec­
ondary education, and then, we hope, complete four-year degrees at world-
class universities. Afterward, they will likely have their choice of professions. 
They are more likely to suffer from a crisis of choosing which occupation best 
fits their interests than from chronic unemployment. 
Many families are like ours. Their stories illustrate what can happen to 
people when they live in places with the right institutions. They are likely 
to lead long, prosperous, meaningful, and fulfilling lives of their own 
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choosing—or at least as likely as one might ever expect to get. They are likely 
to be the authors of their own lives, rather than leading lives forced upon 
them by tradition, command, or necessity. 
Almost every book on global justice begins by talking about how desper­
ately poor some people are. We took a different path. We began by talking 
about how rich some people are. We don't do this to rub our good fortune in 
the faces of those with less. We do this to draw attention to how remarkable 
the existence and relative accessibility of this kind of wealth really is. Wealth, 
in other words, is the exception—its the thing that needs to be explained, 
understood, and replicated. 
In contrast, poverty is boring. Poverty is normal, in a statistical sense. It is 
not normal in a normative sense: it is not how things should be. It is normal 
in the sense that poverty is human beings' default, natural state. Almost eve­
ryone who has ever lived has been desperately poor, malnourished, and at 
risk of premature death. Aiden, Keaton, and Miles are highly unusual. When 
their parents suffer a misfortune—a car breaks down, the kitchen sink springs 
a leak, or even a parent loses a job—this has no noticeable effect on their 
lives. That's interesting and strange. Around the world most people, for most 
of human history, would have found cost-equivalent setbacks financially 
devastating. 
Two thousand years ago, everyone everywhere was poor. This state of 
affairs seemed permanent. Religious leaders who advocated charity did so to 
nourish the soul or ease the burden of poverty, but did not expect that charity, 
or anything else, could eliminate poverty altogether. Poverty, it seemed, was 
here to stay. 
But some places stopped being poor. In some places, there are only pockets 
of poverty among vast fields of wealth, where poverty is unusual, something 
to be gawked at, where depictions of extreme poverty captivate readers as 
much as descriptions of fantastic or alien worlds. In other places there are 
pockets of wealth, where the opposite is true. The key to solving world pov­
erty is, probably, to figure out why some places became rich and then repeat 
or spread the causes of success. 
The good news is that this is already happening. In the past 40 years, more 
people (in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total population) have 
been lifted out of extreme poverty than in all of history before. In 1820, about 
95% of people lived in extreme poverty. In i960, about two-thirds lived in 
extreme poverty. Now, less than 10% of the world does. Perhaps most remark­
ably, these numbers are proportions. Over the same period, world popula­
tion has been increasing—especially in the poorest parts of the world. Even 
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though there are many more people around, we've found ways of making sure 
fewer are starving.1 This is a miracle, but hardly anyone notices it. 
Adam Smith argued that we should measure the wealth of nations not 
by the size of the king's army or treasury, but by the fullness of the common 
people's stomachs and the opportunities available to their children. In 1776, 
when Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations, most people around 
the world were still living in what we would now consider extreme poverty. 
Nevertheless, he realized, the typical inhabitants of some countries, such as 
the Netherlands or England, enjoyed about three times the standard of living 
of the typical inhabitants of others, such as Spain or France.2 
The phenomenon—that some countries became rich quickly while others 
did not—is often called the Great Divergence. Smith's explanation for the 
Great Divergence is that the (now) richer countries had better institutions 
and policies, which in turn encouraged higher forms of economic produc­
tivity and growth, and these in turn made even the relatively poorest citizens 
of those countries richer. The (still) poor countries had bad institutions, bad 
policies, and a lot of violence. They're run by what we might call extractive 
elites, groups of people who make their money by extracting wealth and re­
sources from their people. These things encouraged economic stagnation, 
which in turn ensured that the poor remained poor, just as they always 
had been. 
Ending poverty requires institutions that protect and enhance people s 
economic productivity and innovation. Economic growth matters. Indeed, 
as we'll see, when it comes to fighting world poverty, it matters more than 
anything else. 
To illustrate: on most reliable estimates, per capita world product— 
the total amount of yearly economic production worldwide per person— 
probably just barely doubled between 5000 B.C. and 1800 A.D.3 Since then, 
it has increased by a factor of at least thirty.4 Importantly—and this point 
will be critical—wealth has been created, not just moved around. In 2014 the 
United States produced more real output, by itself, than the entire world did 
in 1950.5 
Imagine you could redistribute all the income produced in 1000 A.D. 
equally among everyone in the world. Even if you did that, the median, av­
erage, and modal standards of living would still be what the United Nations 
now considers extreme poverty. (According to Angus Maddison, world 
GDP/capita in 1000 A.D. was only about $450 in 1990 US dollars.6) 
Even John Rawls, the pre-eminent left-liberal political philosopher of the 
past 65 years, argues that we should not much worry about redistribution or 
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egalitarian ideals of justice until we've reached a suitable level of economic 
development.7 When the pie is tiny, it doesn't much matter how you cut it. 
Most people will get crumbs. If you want everyone to have a decent slice of 
pie, the important thing is to make sure, first and foremost, that there is a lot 
of pie. 
Some people who read the stories of Aiden, Keaton, and Miles might react 
by thinking, "That's not fair! We need to take some of what those kids have 
and give it to those who have less." Others might think, "Good for those kids. 
We need to figure out away to make everyone have that good of a life." It may 
not be obvious now, but these are two radically different ways of thinking 
about poverty. And once we see that, there will be little to recommend the 
first kind of reaction. 
Global Justice as a Positive-Sum Game 
Many philosophers who write about global justice defend things like new or 
stronger human rights protecting peoples political and civil liberties. They 
claim to have discovered various socio-economic rights, like a right to a de­
cent standard of living, access to high quality health care, even rights to be 
protected from social deprivation. They want to introduce more robust and 
more internationally oriented forms of democracy. And they propose, in one 
form or another, large-scale redistributive solutions to the problems of world 
poverty. 
What sets us apart is the question of whether these kinds of proposals 
should be the exclusive or primary focus of a theory of global justice. Or, per­
haps better, what sets us apart is what the global justice literature tends to 
leave out. What's left out is protection and recognition of the basic building 
blocks that make development even possible. There is overwhelming evidence 
that basic economic rights and freedoms—things like stable property rights, 
robust protections of freedom of contract, and a guarantee of the freedom of 
labor—are necessary for development.8 The main point of this book is that 
these rights are absolutely central to global justice. 
The lesson we take from the history of poverty and wealth creation is 
that people, societies, and indeed the world flourish more when people are 
rewarded for productive activities, the kind of activities that bring valued 
goods and services into the lives of others. They wither when what's rewarded 
are the kind of extractive activities that thieves, dictators, warlords, and 
oppressors like to engage in—the kind of activities in which one party's gain 
comes at the expense of another. 
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As we'll argue throughout this book, we think global justice requires that 
we expand and protect the ways in which people s relations can be seen as pos­
itive-sum forms of interaction, and avoid zero-sum (or, worse, negative-sum) 
forms. A zero-sum game is an interaction in which one person can win only 
if, and only to the extent that, another loses. For example, in poker, no money 
is made; it is only moved around. You can win $100 only if someone else loses 
money. (In a casino, playing poker is a negative-sum game, as the house takes 
a rake.) 
A positive-sum game, by contrast, involves interactions through which 
people can gain without those gains having to be offset by corresponding 
losses for others. At their best, positive-sum interactions make all parties 
better off (or at least make no one worse off).9 The paradigmatic case of a 
positive-sum interaction is trade. Typically, parties engage in voluntary trade 
because they expect to, and generally do, benefit from the exchange. They 
might want to make a profit, desire to obtain goods they personally value 
higher, or care about benefiting others. In one way or another, trading part­
ners typically walk away from an exchange better than they approached it. 
Thinking about justice in these terms allows one to see what's wrong with 
theories that focus on redistributive proposals as the main solution to the 
problems of global poverty. Redistributive policies, while sometimes justifi­
able, are zero-sum in nature. They move money from one place to another, 
attempting to make the latter better offby making the former worse off. 
These zero-sum principles lie at the heart of major theories in the global 
justice literature. Cosmopolitan egalitarians argue that helping people in de­
veloping countries requires people in rich countries to strongly sacrifice their 
self-interest. Nationalist egalitarian theories resist, concluding that people in 
the First World do not have to redistribute to the Third World, yet also resist 
allowing people to move from the developing to the developed world. Both 
views accept the (as we'll soon see, mistaken) empirical claim that helping the 
world's poor must hurt the world's rich. 
In our view, the goal should be to turn zero-sum forms of interaction 
into positive-sum ones, to replace the sources of poverty and oppression 
with sources of prosperity and productivity. To put it in slogan form: what 
solves zero-sum problems is changing the nature of the game, not changing 
who extracts how much from whom.10 
To us, the main ingredient of global justice is freeing up people's ability 
to put their persons and goods to work where they see this as most valuable. 
It means opening borders—allowing people to move where their talents will 
be most valued. It means freeing up trade—allowing people to move their 
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possessions where they will be most valued. And it means robustly protecting 
the economic freedoms and property rights that surround and protect their 
abilities to make best use of those opportunities. 
In short, what global justice requires is openness. It requires that rich 
countries, and the institutions they control, allow foreigners to make mu­
tually beneficial, voluntary trades with their own citizens. We will argue, 
on a variety of grounds, that everyone everywhere has a right of migra­
tion, a right to trade, and right to possess, use, and profit from productive 
property. 
Thinking about global justice in these terms fits with a broader view of 
justice to which we are attracted. In our view, when justice obtains, that's 
supposed to be a welcome thing, something to celebrate rather than bemoan. 
(And the reasons for celebration are more than merely the fact that justice 
would obtain.) The point of justice, among other things, is to make our world 
a good place for everyone to live in. 
If justice is achieved, we can see others as people we are glad to welcome 
into our communities—local, national, or the human community at large. 
We can see others as people who bring something to the table, people who 
will end up making our lives go better and not threats to our own lives, goals, 
and freedoms. We can celebrate the birth of others' babies and the arrival of 
new immigrants, because they bring us fellow cooperators rather than mouths 
we will end up having to feed. And, perhaps most importantly, when justice 
obtains, we can see ourselves as people others have reason to welcome, people 
who offer promise, advantage, and progress. 
We defend these conclusions out of humanitarianism, out of concern for 
the plight of the world's poor. We fail to do right by others, and especially 
the poor, when we don't recognize their contributions, productive poten­
tial, and resourcefulness. We fail to do right by people when we picture them 
as mouths to be fed, rather than the cooperators and contributors that they 
would like to be. We fail to do right by them when we treat them primarily as 
consumers rather than producers. 
As anyone who has ever visited a developing country will know, the 
world's poor are extremely enterprising." They find ways, against great odds, 
of providing for themselves and the people they care about. Their cities are 
bustling with commercial activity, from small vendors to people collecting 
cardboard boxes on the street, and those searching garbage dumps for metals 
to sell. These people are not helpless victims. They are people who work hard, 
make plans, and find ways to survive and better themselves as well as others. 
They are victims, to be sure, but the main perpetrator is not a global order that 
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fails to provide for them. It's a global order that fails to welcome them and 
allow them to make their contributions, and the local orders that feed upon 
them like parasites. 
False Starts 
Theories of justice can go wrong in a variety of ways. They can invoke mis­
taken moral principles. Or they can invoke mistaken empirical claims, leading 
them to misapply correct moral principles. Or they can go wrong by making 
their principles not sufficiently sensitive to the empirical conditions in which 
they are supposed to apply. 
This will be a recurring theme throughout this book. That ending poverty 
requires positive-sum forms of cooperation may seem like a mere empirical 
claim. But it makes a difference morally, too. Knowing what actually has a his­
tory of making a difference helps one appreciate what's morally appropriate to 
demand of others. And flawed moral principles often look attractive because 
they match flawed empirical views. 
Many people believe that global justice requires mass redistribution from 
rich to poor countries. We'll take a close look at their arguments in later 
chapters. We've noticed that many of the people who are attracted to these 
redistributive views find them appealing at least in part because they also 
hold empirically inaccurate beliefs. They often endorse one or more of the 
following claims: 
• The reason some countries are rich and others are poor is that natural 
resources are unevenly (and therefore unfairly) distributed around the 
globe. The rich are rich because they have or had access to more or better 
resources than poor countries. 
• The reason some countries are rich and others are poor is that the rich 
countries extracted resources from the poor countries. The history of colo­
nialism is a key causal explanation of economic development. 
• We can easily end world poverty if rich countries simply redistribute a 
large enough portion of their wealth to the developing world. 
These, of course, are economic claims. But they play an important role in 
many people's normative thinking. In one form or another, they represent 
what we're calling zero-sum analyses of poverty and development. They re­
gard world poverty as a simple problem of resources being misallocated: too 
much here, too little there. 
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Once claims like these are accepted, and the zero-sum framework is es­
tablished, the natural next step will be to search for moral justifications for 
redistributing wealth in order to fix the misallocation. 
But these empirical claims are false starts. They misdiagnose what caused 
the Great Divergence, and they misidentify what steps actually have a chance 
of solving world poverty. The Great Divergence did not result from there 
having been a common pool of resources and, at some point, the rich taking 
more than their fair share, taking what belonged to others, and so on. The 
causes of prosperity have to do with turning the zero-sum forces of extraction 
into positive-sum forces of real production and innovation. Whatever might 
be the correct principles of justice must fit that point. They must include and 
empower the productive powers of the worlds poorest, enabling them to 
better themselves and others. 
Changing the intuitive appeal of redistributive solutions to global justice, 
then, requires setting straight the empirical misconceptions that give these 
proposals their intuitive force. The next section does this. 
The Fact of Growth 
It bears repeating: everyone used to be poor. Almost all people everywhere 
throughout human history lived under what we now would refer to as "ex­
treme poverty." Economist Brad Delong estimates that in 5000 B.C., per 
capita world product—the total amount of yearly economic production 
worldwide per person—was only about $130 (in 2.002 USD), and barely 
doubled to $250 by the year 1800.12 Economist Angus Maddison, whose his­
torical data is widely used, offers higher numbers: $457 USD (1990 dollars) 
in 1 A.D., rising to $712 USD in 1820.13 The exact numbers are somewhat 
disputed. But it's not disputable is that extreme poverty was once widespread 
and normal, and now it is not. Until recently, almost everyone everywhere 
was poor. 
When the history of economic growth is drawn on a chart, as in Figure 
1.1, it looks like a hockey stick.14 We condensed the period from 1 to 1500 
A.D. (and all of human history before that) because, despite rising and falling 
empires, golden and dark ages, the lines hardly move. Had we not done this, 
the picture would be even more dramatic. From the beginning of time until 
about 250 years ago, pretty much nothing (in terms of income per capita) 
happened. There were occasional blips and dips, as a good harvest might feed 
a few extra bellies, or a bad war might leave them starving, but the norm was 
that everyone was poor. As John Maynard Keynes put it: 
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GDP/Capita, 1 AD-2003 AD 
Year 
figure i.i GDP/Capita, i A.D.-2003 A.D. 
Source-. Maddison 2007, 70. 
From the earliest times of which we have record ... down to the be­
ginning of the eighteenth century, there was no very great change in 
the standard of life of the average man . . . Ups and downs certainly. 
Visitations of plague, famine, and war. Golden intervals. But no pro­
gressive, violent change. Some periods perhaps 50 per cent better than 
others—at the utmost 100 per cent better than before—in the four 
thousand years which ended (say) in A.D. 1700.15 
Then something changed. The stagnation ended. In the past 200 years, per 
capita world product has increased by a factor of at least 30.16 Absolute 
levels of wealth grew faster than the population at large. People—as in en­
tire countries—got richer. Today, some of the richest countries in the world 
(e.g., Singapore) enjoy average standards of living that are 80 times that of 
the poorest countries (e.g., Burundi).17 Average people in the United States 
consume per week roughly what most people in sub-Saharan African coun­
tries consume per year.18 There is a huge gap between the wealth, income, and 
standard of living of the people in the richest countries and that of the people 
in the poorest countries. 
This was not always so. In 1821, the gap between Western Europe and the 
world average was only about two to one, while the gap between the richest 
and poorest countries was only about five to one.19 If we go back further into 
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history, the gap closes. Indeed, early medieval Europe was poorer than China 
at the time. In iooo A.D., every person in every geographic region had roughly 
the same (poor) standard of living.20 
Note the shape of the curves in Figure i .i . Yes, Western Europe and the 
Western European offshoots grew faster than the rest of the world, and, yes, as 
a result, the gap between Europe's standard of living and the rest of the world 
grew. But notice that even the poorest regions enjoyed some growth. It's not 
that Western Europe and the European offshoots grew rich while the other 
countries became even poorer. It's not as though Western Europe grew rich 
at the rate others grew poor, which would suggest a zero-sum reallocation of 
a fixed stock of existing wealth. Rather, the other countries for the most part 
started off as poor, and got slightly richer over time, while the European coun­
tries and their offshoots started off as poor, and got much richer over time. 
The Quality of Institutions Trumps Everything Else 
When Thomas Pogge, perhaps the leading theorist of global justice, writes 
about global justice, he defends one of his preferred redistributive proposals 
by pointing out that the world's rich have unilaterally excluded the poor from 
their fair share of the worlds natural resources. Pogge thinks this unjust be­
cause people worldwide have a claim to "a proportional resource share."21 
Redistribution is justified, according to him, in order to set straight this une­
qual access to resources. 
Sometimes remarks like these are offered as an explanation of why rich 
countries became rich. However, as such, they simply don't hold up.22 As 
economist David Weil summarizes the empirical literature in his textbook 
Economic Growth, "the effect of natural resources on income is weak at best."23 
Natural resources can help, but they can harm development as well. For in­
stance, China after the 1950s was and remains poorer than Singapore or Hong 
Kong, though the latter have no natural resources to speak of. The USSR was 
poorer than the United States, though the USSR had better natural resources. 
In Adam Smith's time, the Netherlands and England were richer than France, 
though France had more and better natural resources. And so on. 
Indeed, while natural resources can sometimes spur growth, they fre­
quently inhibit growth. Economists refer to this problem as the "resource 
curse." Countries with a high concentration of easily extractable natural re­
sources frequently suffer from economic stagnation. There are competing 
theories of why this is so (though these theories are largely compatible, as 
they identify what might be jointly contributing causes). One theory holds 
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that countries with abundant natural resources "do not develop the cultural 
attributes necessary for economic success," in part because necessity is the 
mother of invention.24 Another theory is that countries that enjoy resource 
booms tend to just consume the sudden influx income in an unsustainable 
way. They don't develop capital, but eat away the extra income until it's gone. 
Yet another theory, called the Dutch Disease theory, holds that a sudden 
abundance of resources leads to contractions in manufacturing. 
But the most popular theory (or, more precisely, the theory thought to 
identify the most significant set of causes) is that when a country enjoys 
abundant resources, this encourages governments to act in destructive ways. 
Government officials can just extract resources for their own selfish ends, and 
can afford to ignore or oppress their own people. Fighting over control of 
the resources can lead to civil war. But the dynamics needs not be so violent 
or nasty. "Nicer" governments might create unsustainable welfare programs, 
programs they can only afford so long as commodity prices for that resource 
stay high.2' 
Contrary to resource-based explanations, the dominant view in develop­
ment economics is that sustained economic growth results from having good 
economic and political institutions.26 Institutions, Nobel Laureate Douglas 
North writes, "are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction."27 These rules can 
set the terms for social interaction in different ways, ranging from the harmful 
to the productive. The view that setting these terms in the most productive 
manner is the key to explaining growth has quickly become dominant in eco­
nomics.28 While no one thinks that institutions are all that matters, their im­
portant is widely seen as paramount. As economist Dani Rodrik summarizes, 
"the quality of institutions trumps everything else."29 
Of course, the field of economics is as full of disputes as any other. And 
it's by no means uncontroversial what kinds of policies might lead to devel­
opment. Still, economists largely agree on a number of basic conclusions, 
such as that countries with robust systems of private property, protected by 
the rule of law, and governed by strong, inclusive states, offer much better 
prospects for significant and sustained development than those that lack such 
protections.30 
Figures i.z through 1.5 illustrate some of these correlations. Note that we 
are not trying here to demonstrate or prove that these findings are correct. 
Our goal here is articulate some of the main results of social scientific in­
quiry that theories of global justice ought to incorporate. We are reporting 
their findings and summarizing their reasons, but readers should refer to the 
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FIGU R E  1 .3 Economic Freedom and GDP/Capita 
Source: World Bank 1013, authors' calculations. 
economics literature directly if they want to see a rigorous demonstration of 
these conclusions. 
Figure 1.2. appears in a review paper by Acemoglu and Robinson. It 
illustrates that countries with better protection of private property tend to 
be richer.31 
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 use data from James Gwartney, Robert Lawson, and 
Joshua Flail's Economic Freedom of the World 1014 and 2016 annual reports.32 
Each year the Fraser Institute, a Canadian think tank, rates countries according 
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Fraser Institute Economic Freedom Quartile 
2016 Index of Economic Freedom 
FIGURE  1 .4 Economic Freedom and Income Earned by the Poorest 10% 
Source-. Gwartney et al. 2,016. 
to their commitment to economic freedom, taking account of such factors as 
access to sound money, free trade, ease of starting and doing business, ease 
of investing capital, the protection of property rights, and the degree of gov­
ernment control or manipulation of the economy. The most economically 
free countries, according to the report, include Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, and Switzerland. Many of the Scandinavian countries—which some 
Americans mistakenly refer to as "socialist"—beat the United States overall 
on economic freedom, and others beat it on many central aspects of economic 
freedom. (The Wall Street Journal, together with the Heritage Foundation, 
produces a similar index, and gets similar results.33) 
Figure 1.3 shows the correlation between overall economic freedom, as 
rated by the Fraser Institute report, and GDP/capita, as measured by the 
World Bank.34 Figure 1.4, which is taken directly from the Fraser Institute 
report, shows the relationship between economic freedom, and the absolute 
level of income of the poorest io%.35 Note that Figure 1.4 measures income 
before internal transfers or welfare payments take place. The freest countries 
are also the richest countries, and generally have the most generous welfare 
systems. Thus, Figure 1.4 understates how well the "poor" do in the freest 
countries. 
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Figure 1.5 is similar to Figure 1.3. Each year, the World Justice Project 
produces a Rule of Law Index, which rates countries by the degree to which 
countries adhere to the rule of law, aggregating such factors as checks and bal­
ances on government power, the absence of corruption, openness of govern­
ment, protection of human rights, provision of order and security, effective 
regulatory enforcement, and proper and effective provision of civil and crim­
inal courts.36 In Figure 1.5, we plot the Rule of Law Index score for various 
countries, as assigned by the World Justice Project, against GDP/capita (as 
measured by the World Bank), and find a robust correlation. 
Again, these charts merely show correlations. They are not enough on 
their own to demonstrate causation. We place them here only to show readers 
just how robust the correlations are. At the same time, there is evidence that 
the relationships illustrated here are causal—it's not just that richer countries 
happen to do a better j ob protecting private property, but that protecting pri­
vate property leads to increased prosperity.37 
One way to illustrate the power of institutions is to examine countries 
that have recently become more capitalist, or less capitalist, and then see how 
these changes affect their development in the short term. In a recent paper, 
economist Peter Leeson examines what happened to countries that become 
more capitalist between 1980 and 1005, and compares their performance to 
countries that became less capitalist in that same period. The countries that 
become more capitalist also enjoyed about a 33% increase in real per capita 
income, about five extra years of life expectancy, about a year and a half of 
extra schooling per capita, and saw dramatic increases in how democratic 
they are. The countries that became less capitalist saw their income stagnate, 









0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Worldjustice Project Rule of Law Index 2015 
R = .8697 
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Source-. World Bank 1013, Authors' calculations. 
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life expectancy drop, and became less democratic. (They did, however, enjoy 
about half a year's worth of extra schooling per person.38) 
The basic mechanisms that produce these results are fairly well under­
stood. As Daron Acemoglu and Robinson argue in their important book Why 
Nations Fail, the main difference between good and bad institutions concerns 
the degree to which they foster extractive activity or encourage cooperation 
and productivity. The main difference, they argue, has to do with whom the 
institutions empower, and thus whom the institutions benefit. What they call 
inclusive institutions empower people across society, and thus tend to benefit 
all. By contrast, extractive institutions empower only some, and thus tend to 
benefit only those small groups of people at others' expense. 
On the political side, inclusive institutions require a state that strikes a 
tricky balance between a reasonable level of centralized power and pluralism. 
Pluralist governments represent many different groups and interests in so­
ciety, through free and competitive elections, and governed by the rule of 
law. Such inclusive political institutions avoid the destructive outcomes that 
fall on the opposite extremes on a spectrum of political violence. On the one 
extreme, there is anarchy and civil war. These are the result of insufficient 
political centralization. On the other extreme, there is tyranny, oppression, 
and rent-seeking. These are the result of too much concentration of political 
power. Societies that find themselves too close to either extreme tend to con­
tain extractive political institutions. 
On the economic side, inclusive institutions secure people's rights to pri­
vate property, including private property rights over productive resources, 
and allow these to be held broadly across society. These allow societies to ex­
perience the kinds of specialization, exchange, investment, and innovation 
that increase productivity. Acemoglu and Robinson write: 
Inclusive [economic] institutions... are those that allow and encourage 
participation by the great mass of people in economic activities that 
make best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals 
to make the choices they wish. To be inclusive, economic institutions 
must feature secure private property, an unbiased system of law, and a 
provision of public services that provides a level playing field in which 
people can exchange and contract; it must also permit the entry of new 
businesses and allow people to choose their careers.39 
Extractive economic institutions, by contrast, are those that limit or alto­
gether prevent the ability of people across society to individually own private 
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and productive property, engage in commercial and profit-seeking activities, 
and enjoy the fruits of their investments and innovations. Such institutions 
stifle productivity. The effects are ugly: 
Nations fail today because their extractive economic institutions do 
not create the incentives needed for people to save, invest, and in­
novate. Extractive political institutions support these economic 
institutions by cementing the power of those who benefit from the ex­
traction ... In many cases, as... in Argentina, Colombia, and Egypt, 
this failure takes the form of lack of sufficient economic activity, be­
cause the politicians are just too happy to extract resources or quash 
any type of independent economic activity that threatens themselves 
and the economic elites. In some extreme cases, as in Zimbabwe and 
Sierra Leone... extractive institutions pave the way for complete state 
failure, destroying not only law and order but also even the most basic 
economic incentives. The result is economic stagnation and—as the 
recent history of Angola, Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zimbabwe 
illustrates—civil wars, mass displacements, famines, and epidemics, 
making many of these countries poorer today than they were in the 
1960s.40 
All this illustrates the importance of the political and economic institutions 
that facilitate production, exchange, and innovation. The rights, rules, and 
liberties that make up such institutions form the basic engine of develop­
ment. They are the things that make it possible for people to leave behind the 
conditions of poverty and oppression. They help societies move away from the 
zero-sum logic of extraction and toward the positive-sum logic of growth and 
prosperity. A good theory of global justice would take these points very seri­
ously. It would give pride of place to individual property rights, the freedom 
to exchange, and the liberty to move and migrate. The theory of justice we 
develop in this book does just that.41 
Our Argumentative Strategy 
This book is divided into three parts. The first part identifies and defends three 
elements of a more open world. What unites these elements is that they each 
are instrumental in widening the scope of potential positive-sum interactions 
in which people can engage. They protect and empower people who want to 
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bring their persons and goods to others who might desire them around the 
world, on terms each party can see as beneficial. As we'll argue, this means 
recognizing people's rights to migrate and trade freely around the world. 
We begin this first part of our argument by defending, on intuitive, moral, 
and economic grounds, the right of people to move where they please, just as 
Jason and Bas are free to move anywhere in the United States at will. This is 
the purpose of chapter z. Chapters 3 and 4 then rebut a range of objections 
to the idea that borders should be opened. Chapter 5 then makes a similar— 
intuitive, moral, and economic—case for free trade. In chapter 6, we defend 
this again from a variety of objections. Finally, in chapter 7 we argue that the 
basic rights undergirding the right to trade freely, rights that we call people's 
productive rights, ought to be recognized as core human rights. 
In chapters 8 through 10, we respond to a number of arguments claiming 
that global justice must be much more redistributive in nature. In particular, 
we address three strategies one might take to defend such an approach— 
strategies that focus on what we might call the past, present, and future. 
The first of these, discussed in chapter 8, takes a backward-looking 
approach, arguing that large-scale redistribution is justified because people in 
the developed world owe people in the developing world compensation for 
past imperialism and colonialism. Chapter 9 looks at arguments which try to 
defend such redistribution in order to correct the injustice of today's unjust 
world order. And in chapter 10 we examine the forward-looking argument 
that bases global redistribution on the interpersonal duty to prevent future 
suffering. 
Finally, chapter 11 responds to what we regard as the most pressing ob­
jection to our view. The objection claims that since increased growth would 
exacerbate climate change, it should be avoided altogether, or at least be lim­
ited as much as possible to only the developing world. While we share the 
objector's concern about the dangers of climate change, we argue that this 
does not undercut our conclusions. 
Throughout this book, we will rely upon common-sense moral intuitions 
and ideas rather than any grand moral or political theory. Thus we will not 
be attempting to show what Kantianism, Rawlsianism, utilitarianism, or 
some other grand theory implies about global justice. Instead, we will begin 
with widely shared principles and ideas. When we challenge common-sense 
conclusions about global justice, we will do so on the basis of more basic and 
strongly held common-sense moral ideas, beliefs or empirical arguments. 
As part of this method, we will use thought experiments that set up 
analogies between moral theories and more familiar interpersonal cases. 
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The use of such thought experiments is familiar: it allows us to test whether 
different proposed theories are consistent with deeply held and shared moral 
beliefs. 
But that's not the only reason we have chosen to rely on this method. The 
other reason is that such examples help engage our moral imagination. They 
allow us to stay alive to the fact that the questions we're asking concern real 
people, living real lives, making real decisions in ways they see as most ap­
propriate given the circumstances. This is important because when questions 
of global justice are put in the abstract, these facts are easy to lose sight of. 
Powerful psychological heuristics encourage us to think of foreigners in 
simplified, and often unfair ways—as monolithic groups of people, a "they" 
who, in one way or another, threaten whatever makes us an "us." We want to 
guard against these dynamics by drawing attention to the fact that these are 
people, persons who have much to offer, if only given a chance. 
As a result of this method, we avoid relying on idiosyncratic or easily 
dismissed moral principles or empirical premises. We think it's deeply prob­
lematic when philosophical treatments of justice rely on highly controversial 
views, say, about the connection between justice and material equality. And 
we think it's deeply problematic when theories of justice prescribe solutions 
that evade, ignore, or cherry-pick the empirical evidence about the conditions 
most conducive to the creation of prosperity and economic and political 
development.42 
One might think that a book defending global justice as global freedom 
would have to do something of this kind, too. It might have to deny moral 
duties of assistance, or would rely upon implausible ideas about libertarian 
self-ownership. Others have offered arguments of this kind,43 but this is not 
our approach. Instead, we will argue that the conclusions of global openness 
we defend are consistent with—indeed demanded by—widely shared inter­
personal moral intuitions. 
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